Wahlprognose Brexit

Kurz nach vier Uhr morgens gestaltet sich das Ergebnis wie folgt:. Dezember , Johnson kann mit einer komfortablen Mehrheit rechnen.

Die Tories haben demnach von Sitzen gewonnen, die oppositionelle Labour-Partei kam nach der Prognose auf Mandate. Ein belastbares Ergebnis wurde allerdings erst am frühen Freitagmorgen erwartet.

Doch es könnte bis zum Schluss eine Zitterpartie werden. Ende November hatte eine ähnliche Erhebung noch eine Mehrheit von 68 Abgeordneten für die Konservativen ergeben, nun gehen die Wahlforscher nur noch von einem Vorsprung von 28 Mandaten für die Tories vor den anderen Parteien aus.

Die Konservativen kämen demnach auf von Sitzen. Labour hingegen verbesserte sich um 20 Sitze auf Mandate. Update vom 8.

Aktuelle Umfragen zur Wahl, die am Samstag, 7. Die Umfragen beziehen sich teilweise auf einen Zeitraum vor dem TV-Auftritt, doch ein Umschwung zugunsten der Opposition war zunächst nicht feststellbar.

Update vom 7. Update vom 4. Demnach kämen die Konservativen aktuell auf 42 Prozent, Labour würde 35 Prozent der Stimmen erreichen. Die Tories hatten bisher immer weiter zugelegt.

Das Wahlregister sei kürzlich auf den neuesten Stand gebracht worden, viele Verstorbene wurden entfernt. Allein das werde dazu führen, dass die Wahlbeteiligung höher ausfallen werde.

Regierungschef Johnson hofft auf eine satte Mehrheit, um sein Brexit-Abkommen durch das Parlament zu bringen und sein Land zum Januar aus der Europäischen Union führen zu können.

Johnsons Konservative führten in landesweiten Umfragen bislang konstant mit zehn Prozentpunkten vor Labour. Jeremy Corbyn: Die Chancen für den Vorsitzenden der Labour Partei stehen besser als noch vor wenigen Wochen — obwohl er als unbeliebt gilt.

Das scheint sich nun in erster Linie in den vergangenen Tagen zugunsten von Labour verändert zu haben. Grund dafür dürften vor allem Leihstimmen von Wählern der Liberaldemokraten sein.

Sollte sich diese Entwicklung bis Donnerstag verstärken, wäre eine Mehrheit für Johnson möglicherweise in Gefahr. Das britische Mehrheitswahlrecht kennt nur Direktmandate.

Ins Parlament ziehen die Kandidaten mit den jeweils meisten Stimmen in einem der Wahlkreise ein — egal, wie knapp ihr Sieg war. Die Stimmen für unterlegene Kandidaten verfallen.

Kurz vor Fristende :. London und Dublin legen Plan für nordirische Regierung vor. Dax und M-Dax :.

Prognose für :. Kerstin Papon Nach der Unterhauswahl :. Jochen Buchsteiner, London Neuer Unterhaus-Sprecher :. Oliver Kühn Klaus-Dieter Frankenberger Nach Wahl in England :.

Gina Thomas, London Corbyn amüsiert sich. Auf dem Endspurt zur Wahl. Kommunalwahlen in England. Thronrede der Königin :. Keine Lust auf Brexit :.

Sturgeon fordert schottisches Unabhängigkeitsreferendum. SPD, Demokraten und Labour :. Elena Witzeck Kampf um Labour-Ausrichtung :. Nach Wahlsieg :.

Krise der Sozialdemokratie :. Warum Arbeiter für Johnson und Trump stimmen. Labour-Niederlage :. Britische Unternehmen erleben Mini-Hausse.

Philip Plickert, London Corbyn übernimmt Verantwortung für Labour-Niederlage. Europäische Union. Boris Johnson.

John Bercow. We don't know whether we'll see a particularly strong performance for the Bus Pass Elvis Party , or unduly heavy rain in that region on election day, or whether the local MP is embroiled in a scandal.

If there is something systematic that might affect the results across a range of constituencies, and which can be measured, let us know. Our forecast is based on a Bayesian model that incorporates the various sources of information described above.

The model reflects what we believe are reasonable assumptions about how to combine these sources of information, but we could be wrong.

These intervals, as well as the mean posterior estimates that we report as our primary prediction, are derived from an MCMC estimate of the entire distribution of possible outcomes for each of the parties.

Most of the uncertainty in our predictions comes from the fact that even immediately before election day general election polls in the UK have not been very accurate.

One consequence of this is that even on election day, we will have substantial uncertainty in our estimates. The forecasts will get more precise, but not until very close to election day.

This year we are not producing forecasts for Northern Ireland. There is very limited aggregate political polling in Northern Ireland, and we do not have access to any individual polling on which basis to make seat forecasts.

At the moment, the forecast is very pessimistic about Plaid Cymru's chances of holding on to the seats it won in the General Election.

This doesn't match predictions based on uniform national swing, which would see Plaid fall back, but not by so much that they would lose seats.

We suspect this results from a limitation of the data we have. We have information on far fewer Welsh respondents to wave 10 of the BES, and Plaid Cymru supporters are a small proportion of those respondents.

Consequently, it's difficult to tell whether strong Plaid support in one region is the result of genuine support or sampling error.

We use as the standard for a majority, even though the non-voting Speaker plus the abstaining Sinn Fein MPs reduce the number of votes required to survive a confidence vote to given the current number of Sinn Fein MPs.

The house effects describe systematic differences in support for the various parties that do not reflect sampling variability, but instead appear to reflect the different decisions that pollsters make about how to ask about support for smaller parties, about weighting, and about modelling voter turnout.

Here are the current estimates of the house effects for each polling company, for each party. If we want to make our best guess for each constituency individually, we would predict Labour in all three constituencies.

However, if we wanted to make our best guess as to the total number of Labour seats, we would predict 2 total Labour seats rather than 3. The discrepency between our individual seat predictions and our aggregate seat predictions arises from this kind of difference, across many constituencies, with varying and non-independent probabilities, across many parties.

We use data starting in for two reasons. In there were UK general elections in both February and October due to a hung parliament after the February election and the inability of any set of parties to form a majority coalition.

Having two elections in makes studying the trajectories of the polls in the run-up to the October election difficult.

Second, the further we go back, the greater risk we have that polling performance has changed fundamentally, and so it makes sense to stop at some point.

This scale comes from "Quantitative meanings of verbal probability expressions" by Reagan, Mosteller and Youtz. The core of our system for estimation and reporting of our forecasts is the R programming language.

Our reports are generated using ggplot2 and pandoc. The pipeline is automated: each day we drop in new data, and then a master script re-estimates the model, re-generates the report you are currently reading, and uploads it to this web site.

We borrowed them. A number of polling companies have now moved to constituency-specific prompts. Accordingly, we have removed the adjustment for the UKIP and Green vote share, with knock on consequences for other parties.

Additionally, we have incorporated new constituency-level data from ICM, generously supplied by Martin Boon. Thanks Martin! We changed the model for predicting seat level outcomes.

The model component is now based on a Dirichlet multinomial model, which allows for some overdispersion. The uniform national swing component is now stochastic.

This is as it should be. We updated our forecasts to include data from January's Welsh Political Barometer , kindly donated by the most fashionable of psephologists, Prof.